Petition for Rulemaking on Short and Distort by Coffee, John C., Jr. et al.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2020 
Petition for Rulemaking on Short and Distort 
John C. Coffee Jr. 
Columbia Law School, jcoffee@law.columbia.edu 
Joshua Mitts 
Columbia Law School, jmitts@law.columbia.edu 
James D. Cox 
Duke University School of Law 
Peter Molk 
University of Florida Levin College of Law, pmolk@law.ufl.edu 
Edward Greene 
See next page for additional authors 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John C. Coffee Jr., Joshua Mitts, James D. Cox, Peter Molk, Edward Greene, Randall S. Thomas, Meyer-
Eisenberg, Robert B. Thompson, Colleen Honigsberg, Andrew Verstein, Donald C. Langevoort & Charles K. 
Whitehead, Petition for Rulemaking on Short and Distort, (2020). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2623 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact cls2184@columbia.edu. 
Authors 
John C. Coffee Jr., Joshua Mitts, James D. Cox, Peter Molk, Edward Greene, Randall S. Thomas, Meyer-
Eisenberg, Robert B. Thompson, Colleen Honigsberg, Andrew Verstein, Donald C. Langevoort, and Charles 
K. Whitehead 
This working paper is available at Scholarship Archive: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/
2623 
 1 




U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
100 F Street, NE 
Washington, DC 20549-1090  
 
Re: Petition for Rulemaking on Short and Distort 
 
Dear Ms. Countryman:  
 
Petitioners signed below respectfully submit this petition for rulemaking pursuant to Rule 
192(a) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice.1 
I. Background 
Short selling serves a critical function in the capital markets by encouraging price discovery 
and preventing the formation of asset bubbles.2  But recent years have seen a rise in “negative 
activism,” a novel phenomenon which has flourished in the era of social media and algorithmic 
trading.3  The typical negative activist opens a large short position; disseminates sometimes 
aggressive negative opinion about a public company (often stopping just short of factual 
falsehoods) on Twitter and elsewhere, which induces a panic and run on the stock price;4 and 
rapidly closes that position for a profit, prior to the stock price partially or fully rebounding.5 
                                               
1 This petition arose out of columns by Professors John C. Coffee, Jr. and Joshua Mitts of Columbia Law School. 
Professor Mitts has served as an expert in connection with market manipulation cases involving short sellers. 
2 See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Short Selling and the News: A Preliminary Report on an Empirical Study, 54 
N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 645 (2009) (finding that an increase in short selling predicts negative news the next day and 
summarizing the theoretical and empirical literature on short selling and price discovery). 
3 See, e.g., Barbara A. Bliss et al., Negative Activism, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2019) (considering whether 
negative activism enhances price discovery); Joshua Mitts, A Legal Perspective on Technology and the Capital 
Markets: Social Media, Short Activism and the Algorithmic Revolution (working paper, 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3447235 (arguing that negative activism may sometimes reflect fraud and manipulation). 
4 Professor Donald Langevoort has analogized inducing a market panic to teenage drag racing, arguing that 
“deliberately say[ing] or do[ing] something designed to take advantage of heuristic thinking by investors, thereby at 
least temporarily destabilizing the market price” should be deemed manipulation, despite the challenge with proving 
manipulative intent in these cases.  Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Market: A 
Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 N.W. L. REV. 135 (2002).  For this reason, we advocate that the 
Commission engage in affirmative rulemaking in settings where it may be difficult to prove manipulative intent. 
5 This sort of trading strategy was identified over twenty years ago by Professor Zohar Goshen.  See Zohar Goshen, 
Fraud and Manipulation: Fraternal Twins, MISHPATIM 591 (1999) (in Hebrew).  It is similar to what Professor Merritt 
Fox and co-authors have characterized as “misstatement manipulation.”  Merritt B. Fox et al., Stock Market 
Manipulation and Its Regulation, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 67, 111 (2018).  These have often been termed “scalping” 
schemes, which involve making statements that lead to investors to purchase or sell a stock, while failing to disclose 
a position or an intent to trade in the opposite direction of one’s recommendation.  See, e.g., James Cox, Insider 
Trading Regulation and the Production of Information: Theory and Evidence, 64 WASH. U. L. Q. 475 (1986) (“[T]he 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3538340
 2 
 
For a recent example, on August 15, 2019, Harry Markopolos accused General Electric of 
being “A Bigger Fraud than Enron.” Specifically, Mr. Markopolos (the first to publicly proclaim 
that Bernie Madoff was running a giant Ponzi scheme) produced a lengthy report that alleged a 
$38 billion accounting fraud at G.E. The key claims were that G.E. was “hiding $29 billion in 
Long-Term Care Losses” with respect to its insurance operations and was also concealing “$9.1 
billion in Baker Hughes losses.”  When these disclosures hit the market in a well-orchestrated blitz, 
G.E.’s stock price fell from a close of $9.01 the prior day to a low of $7.76 per share on August 
15 (when over 400 million G.E. shares were traded). Overall, G.E.’s stock price dropped 21 percent 
throughout August, while the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell only 1.7 percent that month.  
 
Yet G.E.’s stock price subsequently rebounded and recovered most of August’s losses.  By 
November 2019, GE’s stock price was trading over $10 a share. Most analysts, investment banks 
and reporters came to the conclusion that the Markopolos report was unfounded.6  Just one month 
later, the website gefraud.com was taken down and replaced by a “403 Forbidden” error page,7 
highlighting the short-lived and possibly negligent nature of Markopolos’s claims. 
 
At the outset, Mr. Markopolos disclosed that he had “entered into an agreement with a 
third-party entity to review an advance copy of the Report in return for later-provided 
compensation,” which would be “based on a percentage of the profits resulting from the third-
party entity’s positions in” G.E. securities and derivatives.”  However, no disclosure was given as 
to when such “third-party entity” closed its position following the posting of the Markopolos 
report.  It is possible that the third-party entity had closed its position even prior to the close of 
trading on the day of the report. 
 
Research shows that the GE-Markopolos episode is not a one-off phenomenon.  A study 
of pseudonymous short attacks on public companies by one of us has found that these attacks are 
followed by price declines and sharp reversals.8  These data suggest that these patterns are likely 
driven by manipulative stock options trading.  Among 1,720 pseudonymous attacks on mid- and 
large-cap firms from 2010-2017 there is over $20.1 billion of mispricing. These reversals seem to 
persist because pseudonymity allows manipulators to switch identities without accountability.   
 
                                               
violation in scalping cases is the nondisclosure of the advisor's purchase and intent to sell after the recommendation 
is published. . . . A recommendation, therefore, is the sine qua non of a scalping violation.  Prior to a recommendation, 
the advisor's isolated purchase is devoid of informational content. After a recommendation is proffered, the advisor's 
trading activity, past and future, has great meaning to investors assessing the recommendation's authenticity.”).  
6 See, e.g., Al Root, Wall Street Is Shrugging Off Allegations of GE Accounting Fraud, BARRON’S, Sep. 4, 2019, 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/wall-street-comfortable-with-ges-accounting-shrugs-off-markopolos-report-
51567525632. 
7 Al Root, The Website Alleging GE Accounting Fraud Just Disappeared, BARRON’S, Sep. 26, 2019, 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/website-alleging-ge-accounting-fraud-disappears-51569540660 
8 Joshua Mitts, Short and Distort (Columbia Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 592, 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3198384.  
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This evidence highlights shortcomings of the current regulatory framework as applied to 
manipulative short selling.  We petition the Commission to employ its rulemaking power under 
Sections 10(a)(1) and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as follows: 
 
• First, precisely because there is no duty to disclose one’s short position, we ask the 
Commission to impose a duty to update promptly a voluntary short position disclosure which 
no longer reflects current holdings or trading intention. 
 
• Second, we ask the Commission to clarify that rapidly closing a short position after publishing 
(or commissioning) a report, without having specifically disclosed an intent to do so, can 
constitute fraudulent scalping in violation of Rule 10b-5.  We further propose that a safe harbor 
be drafted which would allow for closing a position at a price equal to or lower than a valuation 
stated, expressly or impliedly, by a short seller. 
 
We discuss each of these in turn. 
II. We ask the Commission to impose a duty to update promptly a voluntary short 
position disclosure which no longer reflects current holdings or trading intention.  
The case law is clear that merely taking a large short position is insufficient to establish 
market manipulation.9  Moreover, one can disagree with a short seller’s analysis, but strongly 
stated opinions are not fraudulent on their own.  However, a negative activist typically goes further, 
claiming not just that investors should sell the stock, but that the activist itself is posed to profit if 
the share price declines and lose if the share price rises.10 
 
The truthful disclosure of an activist’s short position can enhance price discovery.  The fact 
that a short seller with a credible track record in identifying fraudulent companies has opened a 
short position in a new stock may very well “alter the total mix of information made available”11 
by aligning the activist’s reputation and economic incentives with its analysis.  This is likely why 
many investors sell shares following a report by a negative activist but may be less quick to do so 
upon encountering a “sell” rating by an ordinary analyst who lacks such “skin in the game.” 
 
It is precisely for this reason that the Commission should vigilantly ensure that short 
position disclosure, when voluntarily initiated by a short seller, remains truthful and accurate. We 
are not advocating that the Commission mandate the disclosure of short positions.  However,  when 
a short seller has chosen to disclose a short position, failure to disclose that the position has been 
closed is doubly misleading: first, because the statement that the activist has a short position is 
literally no longer true; and second, because, the author’s negative opinion lacks the “skin in the 
game” element that gives market participants reason to believe the underlying claims are true.  
                                               
9 ATSI Communications v. Sha’ar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, at 101 (2d Cir. 2007). 
10 See, e.g., Muddy Waters Research, MW is Short OSI Systems (NASDAQ: OSIS), 
https://www.muddywatersresearch.com/research/osis/mw-is-short-osis/ (“We are short OSI Systems, Inc. 
(OSIS.US) because we think it is rotten to the core.”).  
11 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
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At present, it is unresolved whether short sellers are subject to a duty under federal 
securities law to update a position disclosure which has been voluntarily initiated by the short 
seller but no longer reflects current holdings or trading intention.  While the Second Circuit 
recognized a “duty to update” statements rendered false by intervening events in In re Time Warner 
Securities Litigation, the Seventh Circuit has categorically rejected any such duty,12 and 
commentators have pointed out that courts rarely find the violation of such a duty in individual 
cases.13 
 
For this reason, we call on the Commission to engage in affirmative rulemaking which 
imposes a duty to update promptly a voluntary short position disclosure which no longer reflects 
current holdings or trading intention.14  We propose that the Commission define the term 
“promptly” as in Regulation FD: “as soon as reasonably practicable (but in no event after the later 
of 24 hours or the commencement of the next day's trading on the New York Stock Exchange).”15  
That standard is generous compared to Regulation FD, which gives a 24-hour grace period to 
rectify selective disclosures of material nonpublic information only when such disclosures are 
unintentional, whereas intentional disclosures must be shared with the public immediately.  Here, 
a change of current holdings or trading intention is deliberate, not inadvertent. 
 
The Commission has been granted express authority to enact such a rule by Section 
10(a)(1) and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Section 10(a)(1) grants the 
Commission broad authority to prescribe rules governing the effectuation of short sales and stop 
loss orders, which does not require any showing of scienter or fraudulent intent.16  Moreover, 
Section 10(b) grants the Commission broad authority to enact antifraud rules.17  The failure to 
update a voluntary short position disclosure which no longer reflects current holdings or trading 
intention is a deceptive device or contrivance and thus may be prohibited pursuant to the 
Commission’s rulemaking authority under both Sections 10(a)(1) and 10(b). 
 
                                               
12 Gallagher v. Abbott Laboratories, 269 F.3d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 2001). 
13 See, e.g., Bruce Mendelsohn & Jesse Brush, The Duties to Correct and Update: A Web of Conflicting Case Law 
and Principles, SEC. REG. L. J. 67 (Spring 2015).  
14 This solution was first proposed by Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. in a New York Law Journal column on September 
18, 2019.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Markopolos, G.E. and Short Selling as Negative Activism, NEW YORK L. J., Sep. 
18, 2019 (“The SEC could make clear that a short seller who has published critical negative research and announced 
its short position must disclose immediately when it closes out its short position. That would inform the market that 
the short seller may no longer hold its prior position. This disclosure obligation would not be satisfied by a simple 
boilerplate statement by the short seller that it might, sometime in the future close out its short position.”). 
15 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(d). 
16 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a)(1).  Section 10(a)(1) could thus support a more prophylactic rule governing short position 
disclosure than could be adopted by the Commission with respect to transactions other than short sales. 
17 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (rendering unlawful “to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security 
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive device 
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors”). 
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We further urge the Commission to make clear that this disclosure obligation would not be 
satisfied by a simple boilerplate statement by the short seller that it might, sometime in the future, 
close out its short position.  Instead, the Commission should require that the short seller provide 
as much detail as necessary in order to clarify that a prior position disclosure no longer reflects 
current holdings or trading intention.  For example, the Commission should make clear that 
voluntarily making a statement like “we are short [company name]” imposes a duty to announce 
when the activist no longer stands to profit from a decline in the share price, e.g., when the activist 
has closed the short position or purchased call options, swaps or other derivative securities which 
serve as a hedge against economic exposure to a decline in the share price. 
III. We ask the Commission to clarify that rapidly closing a short position after 
publishing (or commissioning) a report, without having specifically disclosed an intent to 
do so, can constitute fraudulent scalping in violation of Rule 10b-5.   
Courts have long held that newspaper columnists are subject to a duty to disclose their 
intent to close a position after advocating the purchase or sale of a stock.  In Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 
the Ninth Circuit found that a newspaper columnist violated Rule 10b-5 by failing to disclose his 
ownership of the underlying security and “his intent to sell when the market price rose:”18  
 
Columnists . . . ordinarily have no duty to disclose facts about their personal financial 
affairs or about the corporations on which they report. But there are instances in which 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 require disclosure. Here . . . the defendant assumed those 
duties when, with knowledge of the stock's market and an intent to gain personally, 
he encouraged purchases of the securities in the market. Campbell should have told his 
readers of his stock ownership, of his intent to sell shares that he had bought at a 
discount for a quick profit, and of the practice of having his columns reprinted verbatim 
as advertisements in the financial journal in which he had an interest.19 
 
The Zweig anti-scalping rule has been applied repeatedly over the ensuing decades, with the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York recently holding in a 2017 decision that 
“scalpers have a duty to disclose their financial interests in touted securities so that their 
promotional materials are not materially misleading.”20   
 
                                               
18 94 F.2d 1261, 1268 (9th Cir. 1979). 
19 Id. (emphasis added). 
20 SEC v. Thompson, 238 F.Supp. 575, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (aggregating case law on position disclosure); see also 
Mausner v. Marketbyte LLC, No. 12-cv-2461-JM (NLS), 2013 WL 12073832, at **7–8 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2013) 
(publishers of an online newsletter had a duty to disclose that companies whose stock they touted compensated them 
in cash, company stock, or both); United States v. Cannistraro, 800 F.Supp. 30, 82 (D.N.J. 1992) (brokers' statements 
regarding certain securities “were rendered incomplete and misleading in that they failed to provide the complete 
picture, i.e., that the author and disseminators of the statements were financially interested in the success of the 
securities in the market.”); S.E.C. v. Blavin, 557 F.Supp. 1304, 1312 (E.D. Mich. 1983), aff'd, 760 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 
1985) (unregistered investment advisor's “failure to disclose his substantial ownership of stock in the companies he 
was touting, and his intent to sell them soon after recommending that they be bought, was a material omission in 
violation of § 10(b).”)." 
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The Commission has recently pursued a similar theory in the matter of Lidingo Holdings, 
where the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington found that the Commission’s 
allegations were sufficient to state a claim for violation of Section 10(b) when a defendant 
“engaged in scalping activity wherein  he purchased issuer stock just prior to publishing an article 
about the issuer, then sold the stock at a profit soon after his article was published, which was 
contrary to the advice he gave in his articles advocating holding for the long-term.”21 
 
Nonetheless, we are unaware of any scalping cases which have been brought by the 
Commission against short sellers to date.  We recognize this may reflect a certain reticence by the 
Division of Enforcement to apply a scalping theory beyond the traditional setting of stock 
promotion (“touting”).  We therefore urge the Commission to clarify by rule that liability for 
fraudulent scalping applies to any individual who encourages the sale of a security and purchases 
shares “for a quick profit” soon after an article is published, while failing to specifically disclose 
intent to do so.  This is a simple adaptation of the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Zweig to short selling.   
 
As before, this disclosure obligation would not be satisfied by a simple boilerplate 
statement by the short seller that it might, sometime in the future, close out its short position.  To 
be clear, we are not suggesting, as some have,22 that the Commission require that short sellers hold 
a position for any duration of time to avoid liability.  Rather, our proposal focuses solely on 
ensuring adequate disclosure. 
 
Finally, we recognize that the possibility of liability for fraudulent scalping may chill 
legitimate criticism of public companies by short sellers, who serve an important function in the 
capital markets.  We thus propose that the Commission adopt a safe harbor which allows for short 
sellers to close a position at a price equal to or lower than a valuation stated expressly or impliedly.   
 
The rationale for this safe harbor is straightforward: when a negative activist states that a 
company is worth a given valuation, investors may sell the company’s securities until the share 
price reaches the given price target.  When a short seller closes its position at a share price equal 
to or lower than a stated valuation, he or she furthers price discovery by making it more likely that 
the share price reflects that proffered valuation.   
 
On the other hand, when a short seller states that a company is worth a given valuation but 
purchases the stock at a price higher than the indicated valuation, the short seller is not furthering 
price discovery.  Rather, the short seller is buying at the same time that he or she is encouraging 
other investors to sell. 
 
To be sure, short sellers may have legitimate, non-fraudulent reasons for closing a position 
before the company’s share price reaches an express or implied stated valuation, such as risk 
                                               
21 SEC v. Lidingo Holdings, Order Granting In Part and Denying In Part Motion to Dismiss, Case No. C17-1600 
RSM, ECF No. 73 (W.D. Wash. May 11, 2018). 
22 See Joshua Mitts, A Legal Perspective on Technology and the Capital Markets:  Social Media, Short Activism and 
the Algorithmic Revolution (working paper, 2020), at *15 (“[A] rule that requires traders to hold a position until the 
market has reached a consensus as to the value of the stock can be justified under the rational view that to do otherwise 
is weakly suggestive of manipulative intent.”). 
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management or liquidity needs.  However, in general, price discovery would be furthered by 
encouraging short sellers to communicate valuations which are consistent with their internal 
trading plans.  Consistency between what a negative activist says and does reduces the likelihood 
of overreaction by public-company shareholders and makes it more likely that the share price 
reflects the true, fundamental value of the information produced by the short seller. 
 
By promulgating the proposed safe harbor, the Commission would give negative activists 
confidence that a well-researched short thesis, which advocates that the firm’s stock is overvalued 
by a given amount, can be freely traded upon at or below the indicated valuation.  On the other 
hand, short sellers who use words like “insolvent,” “bankrupt” or “zero” to characterize a public 
company would be unable to enjoy such the benefit of the safe harbor.  However, such negative 
activists would not necessarily be subject to liability for fraudulent scalping unless they purchased 
shares for a profit soon after the article was published and failed to disclose their intent to do so. 
 
 Finally, we leave to the Commission to resolve more complicated settings such as when a 
short seller should be deemed to have commissioned a report by someone else (as in the 
GE/Markopolos case).  At minimum, we suggest that the Commission indicate that a speaker who 
is compensated by a short seller must disclose any compensation and acknowledge that he or she 
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